Discussion Group Report

According to a Roper Report study, the number of Americans who report that "in the past year" they have "attended a public meeting on town or school affairs" fell by more than a third between 1973 and 1993. Similar (or even greater) relative declines are evident in responses to questions about attending a political rally or speech, serving on a committee of some local organization, and working for a political party. By almost every measure, Americans' direct engagement in politics and government has fallen steadily and sharply over the last generation, despite the fact that average levels of education-the best individual-level predictor of political participation-have risen sharply throughout this period. "Every year over the last decade or two, millions more have withdrawn from the affairs of their communities," says Robert D. Putnam in his article, "Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital, "in the 1995 publication of The National Endowment for Democracy, by The Johns Hopkins University Press. He says Americans have also disengaged psychologically from politics and government over this era. The proportion of Americans who reply that they "trust the government in Washington" only" some of the time" or "almost never" has risen steadily from 30% in 1966to 75% in 1992.

Similar reductions have taken place in the numbers of volunteers for mainline civic organizations such as Boy Scouts (off 60% since 1970)) and the Red cross (off 61% since1970). Serious volunteering declined by roughly one-sixth between 1974and 1989, according to the Labor Department's Current Population surveys. Fraternal major civic organizations have already seen a substantial drop in membership during the 1980s and 1990s. Although America is an astonishingly "churched" society (The U.S has more houses of worship per capita than any other nation on Earth), religious sentiment seems to be becoming somewhat less tied to institutions and more self-defined. Net participation by Americans in religious services and in church-related groups has declined modestly(perhaps by a sixth). For many years labor unions provided one of the most common organizational affiliations among workers. Since the mid-1950s,the unionized portion of the nonagricultural work force has dropped by more than half. The solidarity of union halls is now mostly a fading memory of aging men. Participation in parent-teacher organizations has declined drastically from more than 12 million in 1964 to 7 million now. Membership in traditional women's groups and civic and fraternal organizations has fallen since the mid-1960s. Whimsical yet discomfiting evidence is the fact that more Americans are bowling than ever before, but bowling in organized leagues has plummeted in the last decade or so. These facts evidence as ignificant decline in "social capital," a social science concept which refers to features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit.

But perhaps the traditional forms of civic organization have been replaced by vibrant new organizations. There have been dramatic increases in national environmental organizations like the Sierra Club, feminist groups like the National Organization for Women, and the American Association of Retired Persons (now the largest private organization in the world except the Catholic Church). Although these new mass-membership organizations are of great political importance, for the vast majority of their members, the only act of membership consists of writing a check for dues or perhaps occasionally reading a newsletter. Few ever attend the meetings of such organizations, and most are not likely to encounter knowingly another member. And there is a growing prominence of nonprofit organizations, especially service agencies like Oxfam, the Metropolitan Museum of Art, the Ford foundation, and the Mayo Clinic. But it would be a mistake to assume that these necessarily promote social connectedness. There has been a rapid expansion of "support groups," in which fully 40%of Americans claim to be currently involved on a regular basis. Although such groups unquestionably represent an important form of social capital, they do not typically play the same role as traditional civic associations. Robert Wuthnow opines that small groups may not be fostering community very effectively. Some "merely provide occasions for individuals to focus on themselves in the presence of others. The social contract binding members together asserts only the weakest of obligations. Come if you have time. Talk if you feel like it. Respect everybody's opinion. Never criticize. Leave quietly if you become dissatisfied."

These potential countertrends need to be weighed against the erosion of civic organizations. The General Social Survey shows that the average number of associational memberships has fallen by about a fourth over the last quarter-century. Putnam observes, "More Americans than ever before are in social circumstances that foster associational involvement, but nevertheless aggregate associational membership appears to be stagnant or declining."

He offers these possible explanations for the situation: 1) The movement of women into the labor force; 2) Increased mobility (it takes time for an uprooted individual to put down new roots); 3) fewer marriages, more divorces, fewer children, lower real wages; 4) changes in scale (replacement of the corner grocery store by the supermarket and electronic shopping at home); 5) the replacement of community-based enterprises by outposts of distant multinational firms; and 6) the technological transformation of leisure, which "privatizes" or "individualizes" our use of leisure time (television, movies, VCRs, "virtual reality" helmets) and thus disrupts opportunities for social-capital formation.

Putnam suggests attacking the problem of declining social capital through research 1) to determine what types of organizations and networks most effectively embody-or generate-social capital in the sense of mutual reciprocity, the resolution of dilemmas of collective action, and the broadening of social identities; 2) to identify the macro-sociological crosscurrents that might intersect with the trends described here, (What will be the impact of electronic networks on social capital? What about the development of social capital in the workplace?); 3) to count the costs as well as the benefits of community engagement (with declining social capital has also come a substantial decline in intolerance and discrimination); and 4) to explore creatively how public policy impinges on social-capital formation.

Putnam concludes, "In America...there is reason to suspect that this democratic disarray may be linked to a broad and continuing erosion of civic engagement at that began a quarter-century ago...High on America's agenda should be the question of how to reverse these adverse trends in social connectedness, thus restoring civic engagement and civic trust."