Discussion Group Report

A "new paradigm" in the sociology of religion is a great source of excitement among a growing number of economists and sociologists. Viewing religious behavior through the lens of economics suggests answers to questions about religion that previous theories could not explain.

In this view, religious denominations are seen as companies that deal in various commodities -- everything from eternal salvation to coffee and doughnuts after mass. "Picture believers as investors, trying to decide if the price of goods is right," asks Ellen K. Coughlin, in The Chronicle of Higher Education.

The key assumption underlying this approach is that religion is not significantly different from other spheres of human activity. This rational-choice theory postulates that religious behavior springs from the same kind of basic impulses that other behavior springs from. People choose to join a church or convert to another religion by weighing the anticipated costs (financial contributions, time spent at weekly services) against expected services (moral guidance, a supportive community, life everlasting). Denominations compete for members by lowering the costs or increasing the payoff, or both.

The theory helps explain the vitality of religion in the United States. Over the centuries, religious participation in Europe has dwindled, while in America it has flourished. From the beginning, America has been the home to a wide variety of mainline denominations and upstart sects. Competition among America's many sects explains the country's religious vitality, and the changing fortunes of its denominations. Some churches have declined while others have struggled to replace them.

Laurence R. Iannaccone of Santa Clara University attempts to demonstrate why strict churches are strong. "Why would anyone," he says, "join the Mormons, who are required to abstain from caffeine and alcohol, or the Moonies, who must submit to arranged marriages, when he or she could obtain spiritual sustenance at less cost from the Presbyterians or the Methodists?" He argues that strictness alleviates the free-rider problem that churches often face by weeding out less-committed believers. Stringent rules help to increase church member's commitment and level of participation, thereby enhancing the net benefits of belonging.

Critics of rational choice theory say: The market metaphor may help explain some things about religion, but that culture and identity are so intimately involved that a strict cost-benefit accounting is not the most compelling explanation of behavior. There is a problem with the theory's argument that religion is not only not irrational, but particularly rational. Also, rational-choice scholars, in characterizing their work on religious pluralism as a refutation of the old secularization theory, which held that, as science and technology advanced, religious tradition would inevitably decline, and possibly die off, have misrepresented that process. The consumer model of religion suggests the old religious patterns have broken down, and that itself is a mark of secularization.

Rational-choice scholars are not dissuaded. They believe rationality and market considerations will go a long way toward explaining religious behavior.